Power Without Brakes, 2-Page Summary

Power Without Brakes – Is the FIA careering out of control?

A recently published report on the governance of the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) has found that it operates through concentrated presidential authority, limited oversight, and selective transparency.  

The FIA is ranked in the lower 50% of worldwide sporting federations and, on its current trajectory, would appear to be at risk of losing Clubs from within its Membership or even being subject to external controls*.  

An executive summary of the extensive report can be found HERE.

Commissioned by FIA Forward in the interest of the FIA’s Member Clubs, and wholly independently prepared by the world-renowned Utrecht University’s School of Governance, the report assessed the   governance of the FIA using the Sports Governance Observer (SGO) benchmarking system. The content uses publicly available information and is the third such report on governance of the FIA to be published within the last five years.**

SGO is widely used within world sports including the IOC (Summer Olympics), and some of other international sporting federations cited within this report are FIFA (football), FINA (aquatic sports), ITF (tennis), FIS (skiing and snowboarding) and FEI (equestrian sports). The report was authored by Dr Arnout Geeraert, one of the world's leading practitioners in sports governance.

According to the report, the FIA’s overall SGO index score is 45%, placing it among federations that have adopted the formal trappings of modern governance - such as statutes, committees, and ethics rules – but lack robust institutional policies and safeguards. The FIA’s governance structurally concentrates power in the office of the President and accountability remains confined within a system over which the President exercises decisive control.

Some key takeaways include:

• Democracy without choice: The closed-list electoral system and a non-independent Nominations Committee mean that challengers rarely, if ever, appear. (pp. 30–33).  The FIA conducts elections but not contests. This design ensures continuity of leadership, not democratic renewal, leaving members with the right to vote but not to choose.

• Oversight that obeys the boss: Ethics, Audit, and Compliance bodies answer to the same leadership they should scrutinise. When independence conflicts with loyalty, independence loses. (pp. 41–45). Overseeing functions exist largely to demonstrate compliance rather than to enforce it. They give the appearance of control while consolidating executive authority.

• Transparency that hides the truth: The FIA publishes statutes and annual reports but withholds board minutes, vote records, remuneration details, and conflict-of-interest data. (pp. 22–25). Transparency is confined to information already safe to share. The absence of detailed disclosures makes genuine external scrutiny—and trust—impossible.

• World rank: Mid-table for form, bottom-tier on credibility. The FIA’s overall governance score is 45 %, well below FEI (83 %), FIS (74 %), and FIFA (61 %). (p. 67). Compared with its peers, the FIA performs adequately on written rules but poorly on their application. It mirrors reform rhetoric without achieving reform reality.

• A real and present existential threat: The report warns that the FIA is structurally predisposed to collapse if faced with scandal, legal action, or sponsor withdrawal. (pp. 72–73). The current model trades resilience for control. A single governance shock, financial, legal, or reputational, could undermine the federation’s legitimacy almost overnight.

• Reform pressure will come from outside: Substantial reform is deemed “unlikely to originate from within.” The report identifies two external forces most capable of driving change:

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1) Member clubs, which hold the constitutional authority to demand governance reform.

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2) Corporate partners bound by the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), requiring disclosure of governance and integrity risks. (pp. 73–74).

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The FIA’s future balance of power may shift through external pressure. If it does not establish its own internal brakes, its members and sponsors will be obliged, legally and reputationally, to apply them.

FIA Forward’s Tim Mayer no longer has a seat at the table due to the structure of the FIA’s election process, but others do.  As its current trajectory is unsustainable, and only the Member Clubs are able to effect change, what are they going to do to protect and safeguard the future of the FIA?

Ends

* European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2025 on the role of EU policies in shaping the European Sport Model (2025/2035(INI))
** 2021 report by I Trust Sport commissioned by Mohammed Ben Sulayem campaign team 2022 report by McKinsey commissioned by the FIA